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Introduction to the Special Issue:  
FUTURE-MAPPING THE DIRECTIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION (EU) LAW:  
HOW DO WE PREDICT THE FUTURE OF EU LAW?  
 
Elaine Fahey∗ 
 
 
Abstract: The idea of the future is a vastly subjective exercise and the search for predictions 
of the future is a highly composite exercise here in EU law. The distinctiveness of EU law from 
a methodological perspective as a relatively recent subject with a highly dominant court is worth 
of significant attention. However, the limitations of a court-centric subject have been 
increasingly manifesting themselves. An innate tendency towards interdisciplinarity also 
characterises the new era of EU law. Yet court-centric-ness often dominantes here also. The 
state of the art appears to agree but also be torn by the manner in which the subject has evolved. 
The paper advocates a non-court-centric future of EU law and a focus upon interdisciplinary 
methodology with EU law. It also advocates a new decade to advance critical studies of EU 
law.  
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Introduction 
 
The EU as an organisation has extraordinary “future flexibility”- perhaps unlike many other 
legal entities or organisations.1 Its demise is as regularly anticipated as its expansion. Yet what 
is distinct about EU law and its future? How do we know it? How can and should we imagine 
it? How does it differ from other subjects on the EU? And how does one prove the “why”? 
What about a counter-narrative to the future of EU law? To say that X not Y course would take 
place?2 How is this rightly predicted? And how is this logically and reasonably formulated 
relative to the methods of any given discipline? It seems self-evident in the case of the EU that 
however extraordinary that it is, that the EU’s flexibility does not extend to crises responses 
where EU procedures like many international organisations (IOs) are simply cumbersome. Its 
future is littered with suggestions for its procedural, institutional and competence 
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improvements. And so how is the narrative of the IO separated from its institutional procedures? 
What is a counter-narrative to EU law ingrained as a subject around integration? Opposition 
thereto? That it would not happen? These queries are posed to be indicative of the construct of 
compositive time plaguing EU law as a discipline. How to formulate its future is a core 
disciplinary challenge against the backdrop of its troubled contemporary present and distinct 
history. This Special Issue represents a discrete exercise of future-mapping of EU law at the 
start of a new decade from a diverse range of interdisciplinary scholars across the globe relating 
to European Union (EU) law. It considers: how should we predict the future of EU law? How 
do we predict the future of EU law? It explores how the future is analysed, mapped and project 
as to EU law as a subject and how it relates to questions of methodology. 
The Special Issue considers the future of two grand over-arching fields at the heart of EU 
law EU law: 1) economic and regulatory issues and 2) constitutionalism and the individual.3 It 
examines these fields through three key themes: I) the constructivist future of EU law 
(“making”), II) the methodological future of EU law (“doing”) and III), the conceptual future 
of EU law (“showing”), which are developed here next. 
 
 
I. The constructivist “future” of EU law 
 
A. The impossible probable genre of “Future” 
 
As Philip Allott has stated, more noted for his unconventionalism than “conventionalism”, 
conventionally “[i]n law-making, society speaks to its future, intending that, when the time 
comes, its future will listen to the past”.4 It is also easily overlooked that future studies is an 
extraordinary field of research, with its own genres, sub-fields, methodologies, journals and so 
forth.5 For instance, the World Futures Studies Federation was created in 1973, developing into 
a continent wide organisation with local chapters, often times consisting of businesses, 
entrepreneurs and consultants.6  Yet for those willing to delve further, Clarke’s infamous quote: 
“It is impossible to predict the future, and all attempts to do so in any detail appear ludicrous 
within a very few years,” arguably cannot be bettered.7  The term “futurology” probably means 
little as a “thick” interdisciplinary intellectual idea, especially not to lawyers. Future-looking 
trend forecasting appears annually in many subjects and disciplines and in many types of 
specialist and generalist or popular publications. They fill the deeply human desire to think 
differently and bigger and to engage in change. In Fukayama’s iconic piece on the start of a 
decades long clash between the place of liberal western democracy or modernity as the ultimate 
dominant force of world politics has long since been contested as a state of future, past or even 
present.8 It is also understood to be an iconic representation of the challenge of time and the 
challenges of portrayal of the past, present and future of the global order. Yet it is easily 
transposable to debates on the future of Europe.  
At any given moment in time the EU lurches from crisis to crisis. It struggles consistently 
with partial institutionalisation in some field and incomplete competences, from health, 
migration, the Eurozone to rule of law powers, mostly at the wrong time. However, there are 
                                                 
3 Most famously: “Change is to the law of life and those who look only to the past or present are certain to miss the future” (John F Kennedy 
Frankfurt, 1963). 
4 Philip Allott, “Reconstituting Humanity - New International Law” (1992) 2 European Journal of International Law 219, 224. 
5 Eg Future Studies Research Journal; World Futures: the Journal of New Paradigm Research. 
6 Jenny Andersson, The Future of the World: Futurology, Futurists, and the Struggle for the Post-Cold War Imagination (OUP 2018) 184. 
7 Arthur C Clarke, Profiles of Future (Macmillan 1973) 13. 
8 Francis Fukuyama, The End of Order (London: Social Market Foundation 1997); Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man 
(London: Penguin 2012); Jack Lawrence, The Revenge of History: Why the Past Endures, a Critique of Francis Fukuyama (Lewiston, NY; 
Queenston, Ont: E Mellen Press 2003); Mehmet Kucukozer, “Theoretical and Practical Challenges to Francis Fukuyama's ‘End of History’ 
Thesis” (2005) 26 Social Thought & Research 105; Louis Menand, “Francis Fukuyama Postpones the End of History” The New Yorker (3 
September 2018) <www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/09/03/francis-fukuyama-postpones-the-end-of-history> accessed 31 July 2020. 
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luckily no shortages of sources from those willing to re-imagine the future of the EU.9 A vast 
numbers of articles, books, book chapters have been published on the future of the EU in the 
genre of EU law,10 arguably not dissimilar to its closest legal subject perhaps, the future of 
international law.11 In the “Futurology of International Law”, Trachtman reminds us of the 
fundamental basics of its futurology are likely to be demographics, democratisation and 
technological change.12 Alter argues with equal force that the new frontiers of international law 
relate to cybersecurity, drones and climate change.13 The three-fold or trilogy technique is one 
widely used in advocacy and popular writing, designed to simplify, distil and cogently 
communicate. It is not surprising to reveal common communication tools for persuasion 
embedded with futurology. Yet these communication devices may only take us so far. Many 
significant intellectual projects on the future of Europe or public international law have met 
with the same methodology problems as less idealised or reflective projects- often because of 
the basic “plain vanilla” fact that the future is difficult to predict irrespective of the elegance of 
its portrayal.14 This might lead us to reflect upon the ingrained place of the past “in” the future 
there. 
                                                 
9 Andreas C Goldberg, Erika J van Elsas and Claes H De Vreese “Eurovisions: An Exploration and Explanation of Public Preferences for 
Future EU Scenarios” (2020) Journal of Common Market Studies 1; “Franco-German non-paper on key questions and guidelines for the 
Conference on the Future of Europe” (European Sources Online, 2019) <www.europeansources.info/record/conference-on-the-future-of-
europe-2020-2022/> accessed 31 July 2020; Emmanuel Macron “Dear Europe, Brexit Is a Lesson for All of Us: It’s Time for Renewal” The 
Guardian (4 March 2019) <www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/mar/04/europe-brexit-uk> accessed 31 July 2020. 
10 For an arbitrary selection: In the German Law Journal [2020] 20 experts on 20 Challenges for the EU in 2020: 
<https://germanlawjournal.com/volume-21-issue-01/> accessed 31 July 2020; Wolfgang Weiss, “The Future of EU Executive Rulemaking” 
(2019) 3 European Law Review 337; Miguel Maduro, Loic Azoulai (ed), The Future of EU Law (Hart Publishing 2010);  Koen Lenaerts and 
others (eds) An Ever-Changing Union?: Perspectives on the Future of EU Law (Hart Publishing 2019); Gráinne De Búrca, “The Road Not 
Taken: The EU as a Global Human Rights Actor” (2011) 105 American Journal of International Law 649; Mark Dawson, “Better Regulation 
and the Future of EU Regulatory Law and Politics” (2016) 53 Common Market Law Review 1209; Antonina Bakardjieva Engelbrekt and 
Xavier Groussot (eds), The Future of Europe: Political and Legal Integration Beyond Brexit (Hart Publishing 2019); Nadezhda Purtova, “The 
Law of Everything. Broad Concept of Personal Data and Future of EU Data Protection Law” (2018) 10 Innovation and Technology 1; David 
Lloyd Jones, “Brexit and the Future of English law” (2018) 49 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 1; Andrew Dickinson, “Back 
to the future: the UK’s EU Exit and the Conflict of Laws” (2016) 12 Journal of Private International Law 195; Franz Mayer, “The EU in 2030: 
An Anticipated Look Back at the 2020s” (2020) 21 German Law Journal 63; Dirk Andreas Zetzsche and Douglas W Arner, Ross P Buckley 
and Rolf H Weber, “The evolution and Future of Data-Driven Finance in the EU” (2020) 57 Common Market Law Review 331; Emmanuel 
Jeuland, Raoul C van Caenegem, Le Droit Européen Entre Passé et Future: Unité et Diversité sur Deux Millénaires (Dalloz 2010); Jean-
Luc Sauron, “L’UE: quelle légitimité? Quel avenir?” [2019] The Authority of Law 371; Thomas Delille, L'Analyse d'impact des 
Règlementations dans le Droit de l'Union Européenne (Primento 2013); Peter Csonka, “Les Perspectives Futures du Droit Pénal de l'Union 
Européenne” (2006) 77 Revue Internationale du Droit Pénal 347; Erika Szyszczak, “Future Directions in European Union Social Policy Law” 
(1995) 24 Industrial Law Journal 19; Gisèle Vernimmen-Van Tiggelen and others (eds), L’avenir de la Reconnaissance Mutuelle en Matière 
Pénale dans l’Union Européenne (Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles 2009); Elspeth Guild et Jean-Yves Carlier, L’avenir de la Libre 
Circulation des Personnes dans l’Union Européenne (Bruylant 2006); Yasmine Lahlou, “L'Avenir Du Droit Europeen Des Contrats Le 
Programme D'Action De La Commission Europeenne” [2003] International Business Law Journal 473; Pierre-Yves Greber, “L'avenir des 
Régimes de Retraites: Quelques Remarques Notamment au Regard du Droit International et Européen” (1996) 17 Cahiers Genevois et 
Romands de Sécurité Sociale 59; Siofra O’Leary, “The Past, Present and Future of The Purely Internal Rule in EU Law” (2009) 44 Irish Jurist 
13; Matthias Weller, “Mutual trust: in search of the future of European Union private international law” (2015) 11 Journal of Private 
International Law 64; Paula Giliker (ed), The Future of EU Tort Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2017); Gareth Davies, Matej Avbelj (eds) 
Research Handbook on Legal Pluralism and EU Law (Edward Elgar Publishers 2018) pt III; Martin Trybus, Luca Rubini (eds) The Treaty of 
Lisbon and the Future of European Law and Policy (Edward Elgar Publishers 2012); Steve Peers, “The future of EU treaty amendments” (2012) 
31 Yearbook of European Law 17; Christian Twigg-Flesner, “Comment: The Future of EU Consumer Law–the End of Harmonisation?” in M. 
Kenny and J. Devenney (eds), European Consumer Protection–Theory and Practice (CUP 2015); Jesper Lau Hansen, “The Report of the 
Reflection Group on the Future of EU Company Law–As Seen from a Nordic Perspective” [2011] Nordic & European Company Law Working 
Paper 10; Angelos Dimopoulos and Mavluda Sattorova, “Present and Future of EU International Investment Treaties” (2012) 39 Legal Issues 
of Economic Integration 153; Martin Shapiro, “Judicial Review and Bureaucratic Impact: The Future of European Union Administrative Law” 
(2004) 1667 Judicial Review and Bureaucratic Impact 251; Catherine Barnard, “EU Employment Law and the European Social Model: the 
Past, the Present and the Future” (2014) 67 Current Legal Problems 199; Stefaan Van den Bogaert, “Bosman: The Genesis of European Sports 
Law. The Past and Future of EU Law” in Poiares Pessoa Maduro, Miguel Maduro, Loic Azoulai (eds) The Classics of EU Law Revisited on 
the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Hart Publishers 2010) 488; Verena Murshetz, “Future of Criminal Law within the European Union-
Union Law or Community Law Competence” (2007) 38 Victoria University Wellington Law Review 145.  
11 Eg Karen J Alter, “The Future of International Law” in Diana Ayton-Shenker (ed) The New Global Agenda (Lahnham: Rowman & Littlefield 
2018); Joel P Trachtman, The Future of International Law (CUP 2013); Douglas Guilfoyle, “The future of International Law in an Authoritarian 
World” (EJIL: Talk!, 3 June 2019) <www.ejiltalk.org/the-future-of-international-law-in-an-authoritarian-world/> accessed 31 July 2020; 
Antonio Cassesse (ed), Realizng Utopia: The Future of International Law (OUP 2012); Pitman B Potter, “The Future of International Law’ 
(1943) 37 American Journal of International Law 632; Anne-Marie Slaughter and William Burke White, “The Future of International Law is 
Domestic (or, the European Way of Law)” (2006) 47 Harvard International Law Journal 327. 
12 Trachtman, The Future of International Law (n 11) 66-84. 
13 Alter, “The Future of International Law” (n 11). 
14 Slaughter and Burke-White “The Future of International Law is Domestic (or, the European Way of Law)” (n 11) written in the “post-Kadi 
era” and appear as far-fetched perhaps as Mark Leonard, Why Europe Will Rule the 21st Century (Fourth Estate 2006), where the latter currently 
sells on Amazon for 0.61p (sterling), if a market-based assessment of its value is of any value. 
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It is worth stating that the concept of the temporal past and its breadth is the subject of 
considerable disagreement in the discipline of Contemporary History, i.e. as to “world history”, 
“deep history” and “big history”.15 Vast collections of sources which would previously have 
taken an individual lifetime to collect are now available to undergraduate students and the 
general public alike in the form of digital collections and databases. It is argued that, as a result, 
the “telescope’ rather than the “microscope” is increasingly the preferred instrument of 
examination in contemporary history, whereby the “long-shot” not the “close up” is more 
prevalent.16 This radical shift in how we perceive time, model it, utilise it and engage with new 
sources are all thus open to considerable reflection. They are arguably not just concerns of sub-
genres of history.17 Rather, they are matched in any EU-related course in particular. A new era 
of new analytical sources of the EU and its laws in digitised form, institutionalisation of the 
historical archives of the EU, better digital repositories of previous scholarship e.g. books, vast 
quantities of output from special issues to edited volumes or festschriften, digitised textbooks, 
theses, numerous collections of national, regional and comparative caselaw and so on provide 
an increasingly impressive functionality to look forward. It might certainly be the case that 
future predictions of the shape of EU law, where data-based are more robust than ever before. 
However, this temporal challenge of the future and its composite relationship to the past 
remains the nub of the complexity here.  
 
B. EU lawyers: Committed historians and eternal futurologists? 
 
The subject of EU law has not been short on multiple publications on the future of the subject.18 
However, arguably many have both a telescopic and short lens “longue dureés” scope for EU 
law at least, looking back at 50 years and forward at more. The types of time milestones in the 
history of the EU have tended to generate certain views of the future- where treaty revisions 
have regularly mile-posted integration, followed by referenda in more recent times and then 
shorter cyclical subject-specific frameworks. It is thus arguably routinely common for EU 
scholars to look backwards to engage in future-mapping. It is additionally common for many 
leading contributions to EU law scholarship to engage in some form of “revisionist” analysis 
of the past, revisionism here with a very small “r”. This is often in the form of a historical 
outlook. Arguably, this is because the future and past of EU law are eternally dominated by 
future integration and a perpetual current state of crises. However, the yardstick of the length 
of time looking backwards and forwards is often underestimated as to its composite form.  
Thus most significant interventions in the field of EU law have predominantly always 
been backwards looking and historical, given the nature of integration- perpetually in want of 
a narrative to explain and expound its significance.19 From historians, sociologists to political 
scientists, those examining the foundations of the EU legal system have developed a significant 
literature showing how a committed group of legal entrepreneurs worked to support the 
legitimacy of the CJEU’s jurisprudence and establish European law as a distinct field- 
predominantly constructively backwards.20 Weiler’s “Transformations of Europe” article is 
                                                 
15 David Armitage, “What’s the Big Idea? Intellectual History and the Longue Dureé” (2012) 38 History of European Ideas 493. 
16 ibid 493. 
17 ibid 498-499.  
18 See n 8. 
19 Joseph H H Weiler, “The Transformation of Europe” (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 2403, 2410-31; Cf Daniel R Kelemen and Alec Stone-
Sweet, “Assessing ‘The Transformation of Europe’: A View from Political Science” in Miguel Poiares Maduro and Marlene Wind (eds), The 
Transformation of Europe: Twenty-Five Years On (CUP 2017). See the iconic Eric Stein, “Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational 
Constitution” (1981) 75 American Journal of International Law 1. 
20 Giuliano Amato and others (eds), The History of the European Union: Constructing Utopia (Hart Publishers 2019); Morten Rasmussen, 
“The Origins of a legal Revolution- the Early History of the European Court of Justice” (2008) 14 Journal of European Integration History 77;  
Anne Boerger-De Smedt, “Negotiating the Foundations of European Law, 1950–1957, The Legal History of the Treaties of Paris and Rome” 
(2012) 21 Contemporary European History 339; Bill Davies, Resisting the European Court of Justice. West Germany’s Confrontation with 
European Law 1949–1979 (CUP 2012); Vera Fritz, “Activism on and off the Bench: Pierre Pescatore and the Law of 
Integration” (2020) 57 Common Market Law Review 475; Morten Rasmussen, “Establishing a Constitutional Practice of European Law. The 
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rightfully depicted in rich detail by leading political scientists to be “arguably the most 
influential paper published on the European Court of Justice… as a subtle, reconstructive 
account of the Court’s constitutional caselaw… [working descriptively and normatively 
through the] expansion of the scope of the EU’s jurisdiction and [blending] doctrinal analysis 
with a strategic political account,” paving the way for all of the political science to come.21 
The place of the past is assuming much salience since the history of EU law and key 
caselaw is globally a long-term research project.22 It is a vast research project comprising a 
significant number of scholars from a variety of disciplines, more recently legal scholars. 
However, it is work founded upon a body of caselaw that is studied principally relating to the 
internal market and its evolution.23 Its work is dedicated to revisiting key cases and their 
dossiers. It is also a highly distinctive form of longer-term understanding integration through 
law. It might be legitimate at some point also to ask for the saturation-point (date) of this work? 
At what point is EU revisionism no longer possible, appropriate or legitimate? The demise of 
the EU is so regularly predicated particularly in the midst or aftermath of the latest EU crisis. 
We must ask how does this affect the composite place of the present, future and past in the 
temporality of EU law?  
 
C. The critical voice of EU law: heavily court-centric? 
 
Historically, critical studies of EU law have arguably been associated with camps of scholars 
studying the judicial activism of the Court of Justice, and mostly working to “one side”, against 
the Court. Arguably, one of the earliest and most famous studies of activism is the work of 
Hjalte Rasmussen in his iconic work developed initially in the US on the Court of Justice.24 It 
is fair to say that this work was not “well received” and initiated several decades of scholarship 
centred around the formulation of his argument against the Court, attacked for being 
“simplistic” and making unreasoned claims. Yet it is widely agreed that he irreversibly changed 
the way that we think about EU law, leaving behind, “constitutional law without politics, the 
written constitution as a sacred text, the professional commentary as legal truth, the caselaw as 
the inevitable working out of the correct implications of the constitutional text and the 
constitutional court as to disembodied voice of right reason and constitutional teleology”.25 He 
ultimately challenged the so-called “Pescatore” School of European Law prevailing, based on 
the simple teleology that “EU integration is good, the ECJ is saintly, the Member States 
villainous”, through his interdisciplinary thesis on the politico-legal point of the integration 
                                                 
History of the Legal Service of the European Executive, 1952–65” (2012) 21 Contemporary European History 375; Daniel R Kelemen, “The 
Court of Justice of the European Union” in Karen J Alter, Lawrence R Helfer, Mikael Rask Madsen (eds), International Court Authority (OUP 
2018) ch 10.  
21 Daniel R Kelemen and Alec Stone Sweet, “Assessing ‘The Transformation of Europe’: A View from Political Science” (n 19). 
22 Based inter alia at the University of Copenhagen, American University and now at the Law Department, EUI Florence at the Historical 
Archives of the EU: See European University Institute, Historical archives of the European Union 
<www.eui.eu/Research/HistoricalArchivesOfEU> accessed 31 July 2020.  
23 Fernanda Giorgia Nicola, “Waiting for the Barbarians: Inside the Archive of the European Court of Justice” in Claire Kilpatrick and Joanne 
Scott (eds), New Legal Approaches to Studying the Court of Justice (OUP 2019); Fernanda Giorgia Nicola, “Introduction: Critical Legal 
Histories in EU Law” in Fernanda Nicola and Bill Davies (eds), EU Law Stories, Contextual and Critical Histories of European Jurisprudence 
(Cambridge University Press 2017); Antoine Vauchez, “Upside Down, Inside Out: A Process-Oriented Approach to the ‘Political Role’ of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union” in Claire Kilpatrick and Joanne Scott (eds), New Legal Approaches to Studying the Court of Justice, 
Collected Course of Academy of EU Law, vol 28 (OUP 2019).  
24 Hjalte Rasmussen, On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice. A Comparative Study in Judicial Policy-Making (Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1986); Mauro Cappelletti, “Is the European Court of Justice ‘Running Wild’?” (1987) 12 European Law Review 
4; Joseph H H Weiler, “The Court of Justice On Trial” (1987) 24 Common Market Law Review 555, 576; AG Toth, “On Law and Policy in 
the European Court of Justice” (1987) 7 Yearbook of European Law 411; Morten Broberg, “Hjalte Rasmussen, The European Court of Justice” 
(1998) 67 Nordic journal of International Law 497; Henning Koch and others (eds), Europe: the New Legal Realism: Essays in Honour of 
Hjalte Rasmussen (Copenhagen Denmark: Djøf Publishing 2010). 
25 Joseph H H Weiler, “Hjalte Rasmussen: Nemo Propheta in Patria Sua” in Koch and others (eds), Europe: the New Legal Realism: Essays in 
Honour of Hjalte Rasmussen (n 24), pt XIII. See Cf Julio Banquero Cruz, What’s Left of the Law of Integration? Decay and Resistance in 
European Union Law (OUP 2018), Introduction, on the role of Pescatore. See also Karen J Alter, “On Law & Policy in the European Court of 
justice: An American Perspective” in Koch and others (eds), Europe: the New Legal Realism: Essays in Honour of Hjalte Rasmussen (n 24) 
1, 5: “For me, the treasure… is that Rasmussen wrote about what others would only say in hushed tones behind closed doors…”. 
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project and his de-reification of the Court. What is remarkable is possibly not the argument 
itself- for many international courts and tribunals and many last instance courts are also 
regularly cyclically subject to the same genre of critique. Rather, it took place alongside a wave 
of significant political science scholarship in East Coast US Universities on the role of the Court 
and integration in the EU, opening up the world view of the Court through forms of realism. To 
this day, the “external” perspective in EU law is significantly often sent via critical reminders 
from leading EU scholars based in third countries such as the EU, often in discipline-shifting 
terms.26 This external distance- geographically, socially, professionally- may be advantageous 
in engaging in reflection but is difficult to isolate its precise salience. 
The post-Rasmussen era of EU law was followed by a wave of members of the Court or 
people associated with the Court, but not directly connecting with the academic debates, in a 
series of defensive and strategically-placed articles, mainly by English judges or academics.27 
A decade or so later, a debate was again ignited by challenges of the former President of 
Germany Roman Herzog that ignited a furore in Germany- and also beyond.28 Some portray 
these debates in three ways only- 1) those debating with a mission to explain as associates of 
the Court, 2) those engaging in normative or descriptive academic arguments using caselaw or 
assessing the performance of the Court more broadly or 3) those wishing to defend the Court 
and its reasoning based upon “misunderstandings” of practice or procedure.29 Arguably, 
although the activism of the Court continues to be a significant subject and object of EU law 
scholarship, the tenor of this specific debate has not been matched in the decades that would 
follow in EU law.30 Whatever about the merits of these strands, they have more broadly 
dominated the adjudication of the subject and the wider question of its methodology. If 
anything, the place of court-centric studies in EU law continues to evolve in its own way. 
However, it also easily risks becoming a self-reifying subject and overly journalistic one at that 
purely from a methodological perspective.  
Stepping back from purely EU law perspectives, in more recent times of rising 
Euroscepticism, however, there is an emerging literature in political science/ international 
relations- thus further away or apart from legal scholarship- on critical EU studies. It has sought 
to target the place of practice and methodology to overturn key assumptions as to EU 
integration.31 Critical Studies- broadly understood- is arguably a useful genre of analytical and 
normative theorisation to apply to the study of the EU at a moment of significant disintegration 
and to apply to legal developments. Here, the actors of everyday action are intensely scrutinised.  
Some advocate the turn to studying this “everyday” practice as a result. Such a genre, for 
example, seeks to bring EU studies scholars closer to the social phenomenon that they want to 
study and argues for the use of approaches which bring scholars closer to the people who 
                                                 
26 Eg, more recently: Daniela Caruso and Fernanda Giorgia Nicola, “Legal Scholarship and External Critique in EU Law” in Siniša Rodin (ed), 
Transformation of Reconstitution of Europe: The Critical Legal Studies Perspective on the Role of Courts in the European Union (Hart 
Publishing 2017); Joseph H H Weiler, “The Case for a Kinder, Gentler Brexit” (EJIL Talk!, 3 February 2017) <www.ejiltalk.org/editorial-the-
case-for-a-kinder-gentler-brexit/> accessed 31 July 2020.   
27 See the monograph of Joxxeramon Bengoetxea, The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice: Towards a European Jurisprudence 
(Clarendon Press 1993); Patrick Neill, “The European Court of Justice: A Case Study in Judicial Activism” (EPA 1995); Geoffrey Howe, 
“How Euro-Justice: Yes or No?” (1996) 21 European Law Review 187; Trevor Hartley, “The European Court, Judicial Objectivity and the 
Constitution of the European Union” (1996) 112 Law Quarterly Review 95; Anthony Arnull, “The European Court and Judicial Objectivity: 
A Reply to Professor Hartley” (1996) 112 Law Quarterly Review 411; Takis Tridimas, “The Court of Justice and Judicial Activism” (1996) 
21 European Law Review 199.  
28 Roman Herzog und Lüder Gerken, ‘Stoppt den Europäischen Gerichtshof’ (FAZ, 8 September 2008). 
29 Michal Bobek, “Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU” (2014) 39 European Law Review 418.  
30 Eg Gerard Conway, The Limits of Legal Reasoning and the European Court of Justice, Cambridge Studies in European Law and Policy 
(CUP 2012); Niamh Nc Shuibhne, The Coherence of EU Free Movement Law: Constitutional Responsibility and the Court of Justice (OUP 
2013); Gunner Beck, The Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU (Hart 2013); Maurice Adams and others (eds), Judging Europe’s 
Judges The Legitimacy of the Case Law of the European Court of Justice (Hart 2013); Mark Dawson, Elise Muir, Bruno De Witte (eds), 
Judicial Activism at the European Court of Justice (Edward Elgar 2013); Thomas Horsley, The Court of Justice of the European Union as an 
Institutional Actor: Judicial Lawmaking and Its Limits (CUP 2018). 
31 See Rebecca Adler-Nissen, “Towards a Practice Turn in EU Studies: The Everyday of European Integration” (2016) 54 Journal of Common 
Market Studies 87; Emmanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, “International practices” (2011) 3 International Theory 1; Richard Whitman and Ian 
Manners, “Another Theory is Possible: Dissident Voices in Theorising Europe” (2016) 54 Journal of Common Market Studies 3. 
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construct, perform and resist the EU on a daily basis.32 In doing so, it looks to disorder and 
order EU studies. It thus increasingly reflects critically upon the subjects and objects of the EU 
law-making and integration processes. As a result, it seeks to challenge the orthodoxy of 
integration narratives but without adopting Euroscepticism as its end goals.  Yet critical legal 
theory or Critical EU Studies is uninterested in EU law as much as EU law in it to date. Most 
standard textbooks on European Union law written in the English language medium do not have 
at the time of writing a chapter on Critical EU law.33 Nor in specialist textbooks on EU law 
does such a topic exist.  
A range of further scholars now advocate more critical approaches to EU foreign policy 
through a decentring of EU actorness in their attempts to capture and reframe perceived 
“Eurocentrism” in a variety of areas of foreign policy- apart from EU IR law.34 This accords 
well with pluralistic and participatory understandings of EU foreign policy. Critical studies may 
afford insights to deconstruct and frame the future of EU law. For example, EU IR law is one 
where the EU risks becoming victim of its own success internally and externally. Yet it also 
risks becoming victim to significant backlashes against Eurocentrism and the complexity of 
decolonialisation. Developments in comparative regionalism look most unlikely to embrace its 
legal successes.35 Critical studies may provide insights, however, it can hardly be said to 
constitute a dominant or mainstream genre of analysis with respect to law. The place of critique 
and external perspective in EU law may be said to be far from an easy target methodologically, 
to which this piece next turns.  
 
II. Methodological lens: on the future of EU law 
 
A. EU law: “beyond court-centric methods”? 
 
Latest debates about the methods and methodology of EU law are largely data driven or 
advocate deeper law-in-context methods or historical studies- perhaps similar to public 
international law and / or related subfields.36 Certain schools now advocate, for example, that 
the future of EU law must become more empirical to realise its scientific benefits, to develop 
the discipline and to broaden the reach of lawyers beyond the doctrinal.37 Many such advocates, 
however, are predominantly often heavily “court-centric” and propose a highly court-centric 
                                                 
32 Adler-Nissen, “Towards a Practice Turn in EU Studies: The Everyday of European Integration” (n 31) 87-89. 
33 See exceptionally (in the English language) e.g. Ian Ward, A Critical Introduction to EU Law (CUP 2009); Andrew Williams, EU Human 
Rights Policies: A Study in Irony (OUP 2004). 
34 Stephen Keukeleire and Sharon Lecocq, “Operationalising the Decentring Agenda: Analysing European Foreign Policy in a Non-European 
and Post-Western World” (2018) 53 Cooperation and Conflict 277; “Decentering the vision(s) of Europe: The Emergence of New Forms” 
(Symposium, Paris, 25-27 October 2018) <www.eastap.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/ABSTRACT-EASTAP-2.pdf> accessed 31 July 
2020; Ian Manners, “Another Europe is Possible: Critical Perspectives on European Union Politics” in Erik Knud Jørgensen, Mark A Pollack 
and Ben Rosamond (eds), Handbook of European Union Politics (Sage Publications 2007) 77; Nora Fisher Onar and Kalypso Nicolaïdis, “The 
Decentring Agenda: Europe as a Post-Colonial Power” (2013) 48 Cooperation and Conflict 283; Elaine Fahey, “Critical International Relations 
Law: A Research agenda” in Paul James Cardwell and Marie-Pierre Grainger (eds), Research Handbook on the Politics of EU Law (Edward 
Elgar Publishing 2020).  
35 See Tanja A Börzel and Thomas Risse-Kappen (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism (OUP 2016). 
36 Eg Arthur Dyevre, Wessel Wijtvliet and Nicholas Lampach, “The Future of European Legal Scholarship: Empirical Jurisprudence” (2019) 
26 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 348; Urska Sadl and Mikael Madsen, “A ‘Selfie’ from Luxembourg: The Court of 
Justice and the Fabrication of the Pre-Accession Case-Law Dossiers” (2016) 22 Columbia Journal of European Law 327; Wolfgang Alschner, 
Joost Pauwelyn and Sergio Puig, “The Data-Driven Future of International Economic Law” (2017) 20 Journal of International Economic Law 
217; See Rob van Gestel and Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, “Why Methods Matter in European Legal Scholarship” (2014) 20 European Law 
Journal 292, 313-316; Michelle Egan, “Toward a New History in European Law: New Wine in Old Bottles?” (2013) 28 American University 
International Law Review 1223.                              
37 Dyevre, Wijtvliet and Lampach, “The Future of European Legal Scholarship: Empirical Jurisprudence” (n 36); Sadl and Madsen, “A ‘Selfie’ 
from Luxembourg: The Court of Justice and the Fabrication of the Pre-Accession Case-Law Dossiers” (n 36); Urska Sadl and Ioannis Panagis, 
“The Force of EU Case Law: An Empirical Study of Precedential Constraint” (May 31, 2016) iCourts Working Paper Series No 
68 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2787119> accessed 31 July 2020; Urska Sadl and Henrik Palmer Olsen, “Can Quantitative Methods 
Complement Doctrinal Legal Studies? Using Citation Network and Corpus Linguistic Analysis to Understand International Courts” (2017) 30 
Leiden Journal of International Law 327; Arthur Dyevre and Michal Ovádek, “Experimental Legal Methods in the Classroom” (2020) 16 
Utrecht Law Review 1.  
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understanding of EU integration as a modus operandi of EU law or place the Court as the 
ultimate subject and object of the data analysis. EU legal scholarship has of course long tended 
to adopt a highly “court-centric” approach. This is not inevitable either. One of the first places 
in the world to teach EU law was at Harvard Law School in the 1960s where Koen Lenaerts 
(now CJEU President) had to teach the content of the EEC treaties.38 To impugn “court-centric-
ness” is not to denigrate this approach- nor are other subjects e.g. public international law- so 
apart- which should be clearly stated- but rather to emphasise that organisational practice, law-
making practice and Court judgments are different. Yet to advocate that a resolutely “non-court-
centric” look at the EU may be considered is perhaps a “minority” methodology.  However, 
non-court-centric views need to be taken into account in any realistic view of contemporary and 
future EU law. One could also claim that even court-centric views should at least concede that 
courts cannot be studied in isolation, but as actors embedded in a specific socio-political 
context, e.g. as regards the relationship between courts and other institutions, or between courts 
and the civil society at large.  
Actorness when pursued as a research agenda in EU law also tends to develop a dynamic 
bottom-up approach to actors shaping EU law. However, it often returns to court-“centric-
ness”.39 How does the subject and object affect the research agenda? Looking inwards, from 
outside of the Court, matters look differently. In a subject where the Court of Justice celebrated 
its own birthday party of 50 years of the Van Gend en Loos decision, its most activist of all 
time, by inviting a significant number of leading EU law scholars to the event, it is difficult to 
separate the court-centric from the rest in a subject with such a heavy calculus in its favour.40 
It must also be remembered that the role of the Court was a central one in the Brexit referendum. 
It put the Court as a ‘red line’ in the negotiations not to be crossed, and elevating it, as a result, 
perhaps even exalting the complexity of its bold supranational dominance. These developments 
clearly impinge upon the direction of the Court as an actor, whose actorness has now become a 
research agenda unto itself, for example, as to its role in generating empirical spread of its form 
internationally.41 The future of the CJEU appears even more public and actively engaged in 
setting the agenda as an institution. A good example of this might the Court releasing press 
releases to respond to the German Constitutional Court decision of May 2020 on Public Sector 
Purchase Programme (PSPP) or using twitter more actively or allowing the President of the 
Court to lead it more publicly in international debates, media and discourses.42 Here, 
transparency and institutional autonomy look likely to radically shape the future of the 
institution going forward and how scholars engage with it. This Special Issue questions court-
centricness where possible and explores future-mapping beyond such parameters where 
feasible.  
 
B. EU “Law in context”: on framing new directions 
 
                                                 
38 Lecture of Koen Lenaerts, Amsterdam, 2013. 
39 Antoine Vauchez, Brokering Europe (CUP 2015); Antoine Vauchez, “Keeping the Dream Alive. The Transnational Fabric of Integrationist 
Jurisprudence” (2012) 5 European Political Science Review 51; Harm Schepel, “The European Brotherhood of Lawyers: The Reinvention of 
Legal Science in the Making of European Private Law” (2007) 32 Law & Social Inquiry 183; Harm Schepel and Rein Wesseling, “The Legal 
Community: Judges, Lawyers, Officials and Clerks in the Writing of Europe” (1997) 3 European Law Journal 165; Antoine Vauchez, “The 
Transnational Politics of Judicialization. Van Gend en Loos and the Making of EU Polity”, (2010) 16 European Law Journal 1.  
40 See Court of Justice of the European Union, Celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the judgment in Van Gend en Loos (13 May 2013) 
<https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/P_95693/en/> accessed 31 July 2020.  
41Eg Karen J Alter, “The Global Spread of European Style International Courts” (2012) 35 West European Politics 135; Alec Stone-Sweet and 
Thomas L Brunell, “Trustee Courts and the Judicialization of International Regimes: The Politics of Majoritarian Activism in the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the European Union, and the World Trade Organization” (2013) 1 Journal of Law and Courts 61. 
42 BVerfG, Judgment of the Second Senate of 05 May 2020 - 2 BvR 859/15, paras 1-237 <www.bverfg.de/e/rs20200505_2bvr085915en.html> 
accessed 1 July 2020; Court of Justice of the European Union, Press Release 58/2020 following the judgment of the German Constitutional 
Court of 5 May2020 (8 May 2020) < https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2020-05/cp200058en.pdf> accessed 31 July 
2020; Koen Lenaerts, “European Court Chief Defends Decision to Strike Down Data-Transfer Agreement”, Wall Street Journal (13 October 
2015) <www.wsj.com/articles/european-court-chief-defends-decision-to-strike-down-data-transfer-agreement-1444768419> accessed 31 July 
2020. 
9 
 
A significant body of literature seeks to frame the future of EU law empirically. For instance, 
decades of jurisprudence is re-framed through a new scientific framing.43 It raises many 
questions- how many sub-fields of EU law can usefully be guided by this methodology? Is the 
mapping of shifts in caselaw, subject fields and policy through empirics alone sufficient? Is 
such a genre of methodology of the future a sub-field in turn of law-in-context? What are the 
historical, economic and other limitations of purely empirical analyses? Are they also overly 
“court-centric”? Do empirics zoom out unduly from the form of revolution and evolution at the 
heart of EU law as a discipline, with its distinctive evolution from public international law? 
And is this empirical turn apart from distinctly or a continuum from the law in context era? 
What kind of empirics should shape this? From who? From what sources?  
It can be said that new directions will need further and deeper analytical prisms. Data-
driven work can easily present “fact” highly descriptively and circumvent normative projects. 
Alternatively, it can use data to set powerful agendas which challenge orthodoxies or generate 
complexity as to the narratives of EU integration historically learned. For instance, Sadl and 
Madsen using “Eigenvector Centrality” have mapped the importance of CJEU caselaw to 
“unpack” historic caselaw dossiers of the Court to present to thirteen new accession states.44 
They find that the selections undertaken by the CJEU  have not been done so neutrally. Their 
highly significant research (question) was anchored as follows: “how does the European Court 
of Justice view itself?” It leads to the challenge as to precisely how this evidence could be 
challenged and by whom? Using what methodology? And what impact or revisionism is 
necessitated by such stark empiricism?45 What place for the future and past hold here in terms 
of framing? They propose understandings of EU integration that are also increasingly 
irrefutable to those outside of their methodologies.46 There are important consequences to the 
empirical revolution that need to be embedded in legal education in earlier stages- and how 
others engage with it- or not.47  
 
While, it is indisputable that much pioneering work on the CJEU may be said to be 
derived from non-legal scholars and which continues,48 arguably it is fair to state that EU law 
has become increasingly interdisciplinary in its ordinary practice if the use of cross-disciplinary 
sources are a viable metric. In an era where interdisciplinarity is rewarded as a benchmark of 
scientific excellence for lawyers, the manner in which it is embedded within EU law becomes 
all the more significant. Major interdisciplinary contributions to EU law are usefully broken 
down as to how schools of thought are invoked and what best practice might be. For example, 
Paunio’s Legal Certainty in Multilingual EU law is said to deploy an examination and critical 
discussion of literature from EU law, legal theory, legal reasoning, multilingualism, philosophy 
of language, theory of translation and an analysis of caselaw of multilingual interpretation of 
                                                 
43 Eg Sadl and Panagis, “The Force of EU Case Law: An Empirical Study of Precedential Constraint” (n 36); Sadl and Madsen, “A ‘Selfie’ 
from Luxembourg: The Court of Justice and the Fabrication of the Pre-Accession Case-Law Dossiers” (n 37); Sadl and Olsen, “Can 
Quantitative Methods Complement Doctrinal Legal Studies? Using Citation Network and Corpus Linguistic Analysis to Understand 
International Courts” (n 37); Dyevre and Ovádek, “Experimental Legal Methods in the Classroom” (n 37). 
44 Sadl and Madsen,“A ‘Selfie’ from Luxembourg: The Court of Justice and the Fabrication of the Pre-Accession Case-Law Dossiers” (n 36). 
45 To similar effect (to a degree), Malecki has used a statistical analysis of different Chamber formulations to argue that judges differ 
significantly in their attitudes towards EU integration, derived from their willingness to follow or defy the Commission’s position in litigation: 
Michael Malecki, “Do ECJ Judges All Speak with the Same Voice? Evidence of Divergent Preferences from the Judgements of Chambers” 
(2012) 19 Journal of European Public Policy 1.  
46 Take similarly, Dyevre and Ovadék paper, ‘The Voices of European Law: Legislators, Judges and Law Professors and their 
distinctiveness’, deploying literally tens of thousands of sources - 200 000 legislative acts, 55 000 court rulings and opinions and 4000 
articles from a leading EU law journal. The engagement with the narrative only becomes possible at an extremely specific level. This is again 
not to denigrate the significance of the work but rather to amplify the need to consider its broader methodolical significance in the future of 
EU law. Dyevre, Arthur and Ovadek, Michal, The Voices of European Law: Legislators, Judges and Law Professors (September 4, 2019). 
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3447770 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3447770 
47 Cf Dyevre and Ovádek, “Experimental Legal Methods in the Classroom” (n 37). 
48 See above generally in Section I and for a(n arbitrary) selection Tomasso Pavone and Daniel R Kelemen, “The evolving judicial politics of 
European integration: The European Court of Justice and National Courts Revisited” (2019) 25 European Law Journal 352; Sabine Saurugger 
and Fabien Terpan (eds), Crisis and Institutional Change in Regional Integration, Routledge Studies on Challenges, Crises and Dissent in 
World Politics (Routledge 2016); Cf Karen J Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law (OUP 2001).  
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EU law and other sources processed into a theoretical fabric woven from interpretation and 
discourse theory.49 To similar effect, Kelemen and Stone-Sweet, writing on Weiler’s iconic 
piece “The Transformation of Europe” describe eloquently its (interdisciplinary) salience as 
follows: 
 
Read as political science, the importance of the piece is three-fold. First, it laid out a 
subtle, reconstructive account of the Court’s “constitutional” case law. This discussion 
quickly became a standard reference point1 for scholars developing new empirical 
research on the legal system’s impact on integration. Second, Weiler described (and 
reflected normatively upon) the steady expansion of the scope of the EU’s jurisdiction, 
findings that would be confirmed in more systematic research to come. Third, it blended 
doctrinal analysis with a strategic, “political” account of why two sets of actors – 
Member State Governments and the national courts – did not destroy the process of 
legal integration in its infancy, though each had the power to do so. Weiler showed how 
the ECJ’s (often conflictual) interactions with national judges had served to allocate 
joint authority between the supranational and national legal orders, while enhancing 
judicial power on both levels. The so-called “judicial empowerment” thesis remains a 
dominant approach to explaining legal integration. Third, and most important for 
present purposes, TE presented a theory of how the Court’s doctrinal moves related to 
state power within the EU’s system of lawmaking and governance.50 
 
Some contend that EU law has benefited from the sources doctrine of international law 
as it developed the basis for its legal order and has enable the adoption of an  international 
doctrine of sources of law at EU law. 51 In this way, international human rights law and EU law 
are major unifiers of national doctrines of sources and thus also major sites of 
interdisciplinarity- i.e. enriching it organically. Future directions are already embedded beyond 
traditional subject fields.  
This leads neatly onto the broader questions of methodology.  
  
C. Methodology in EU legal scholarship: evolution not revolution? 
 
Legal scholarship also has undergone a profound shift in recent times where qualitative 
empirical research has become more common. It has been long been stated that 
interdisciplinarity is important for legal scholars to engage, in order to achieve a reflective 
historical inquiry drawing on the humanities and emerging trends in the social sciences.52 
However, its topicality and salience has taken off in more recent times of the hardening 
“scientification” of the social sciences.53 
Over several centuries, individual European legal cultures driven by positivist dream of 
the proper method have constructed and deconstructed various methods or canons of 
interpretation. In Europe, the emphasis was on reason as to law and the analysis of theory and 
                                                 
49 See Elina Paunio, Legal Certainty in Multilingual EU law (Ashgate 2013). 
50 Daniel R Kelemen and Alec Stone Sweet, “Assessing the Transformation of Europe: A View from Political Science” in Maduro and Wind 
(eds), The Transformation of Europe: Twenty-Five Years On (n 19) 193. See Jan Komarek, “Why read the Transformation of Europe today? 
On Transformation’s constitutional imaginary” (Presentation to the EUI EU law working group (June 2020, on file with the author).  
51 Martin Scheinin, “International law and human rights: Good or Bad for European Law?” in Ulla Neergaard and Ruth Nielsen (eds), European 
Legal Method- In a Multilevel EU legal Order (Copenhagen Denmark: Djøef Publishing 2012). 
49 Elisa Morgera, “Global Environmental Law and Comparative Legal Methods” (2015) 24 Review of European Comparative & International 
Environmental Law 254; Neil Walker, Intimations of Global Law (CUP 2014); William Twining, “Diffusion of Law: A Global Perspective” 
(2004) 36(49) Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 1.  
53 See Christopher Mc Crudden, “Legal Research and Social Sciences” (2006) 122 Law Quarterly Review 632. For Germany: Hans-Eberhard 
Heyke, “Ist ‘Rechtswissenschaft’ eine Wissenschaft?” (2003) 34 Rechtstheorie 229; Rob Van Gestel, Hans Micklitz and Miguel Poiares 
Maduro, “Methodology in the New Legal World” (2012) EUI Working Papers LAW <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2069872>  accessed 31 July 
2020.  
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arguments of legal interpretation and decision-making.54 Yet European legal cultures remain 
remarkably positivist, with a conviction that there are “correct” canons of legal interpretation. 
Jurists have been taught to follow and to display the proper method of legal reasoning e.g. in 
travaux dirigés.55 This is argued to have been translated into a contemporary culture that there 
is a ‘proper method’ for the CJEU to resolve a case.56 This has generated naturally court-
centricness. A robust debate has also been ongoing about “a” European Legal method for some 
time, i.e. whether it exists or even its distinctiveness, not dissimilar to that taking place in 
international law.57 There, the distinction between method and methodologies has been robustly 
contested.58 For instance, some advocate a specific European Legal Method in Denmark and 
Sweden.59 Others advocate the extent to which Scandinavian Legal realism provides a suitable 
background for understanding EU law, where valid EU law cannot be defined solely as the rules 
that the ECJ declares to be the law.60 There are no shortages of subject specific methods at sub-
genre level of EU law.61 While so many contest a distinction to exist between understanding 
EU law through its judicial interpretation or enforcement and conducting EU legal research, we 
argue that the debates are interlinked significantly as to the “how” debates of the future.  
Some have sought to challenge omissions in EU law methodologies as future research 
agenda methodologies. Take, for example, a critique of internal market law adjudicated by the 
Court as a conflict between market and non-market goals to constitute a Keynesian, supply-side 
related theory.62 Others critique of the omission of the social from the internal market project.63 
Perhaps ultimately, the explicitness of the manner in which lawyers reason is an elementary 
challenge in the present and future scinetification of EU law.64 However, time and temporal 
framing remains here an issue apart- mostly implicit, mostly court-centric, which leads to the 
                                                 
54 Some state that the Brussels School of Rhetoric (Perrelman, Olbrechts, Tyteca), the impact of hermeneutics (Gadamer) and of discourse 
theory in Germany (Habermas), the study of legal cultures and legal argumentation (Tarello, Guastini and the Genoa school, but also Conte, 
Jori, Pattaro and others) and the analytical legal philosophy applied to judicial decision-making (Wroblewski) all paved the way for the first 
ground-breaking analyses of legal reasoning as a social case of practical reasoning in philosophy with a group of authors that would eventually 
converge in the so-called ‘Bielefelder Kreis’: MacCormick, Summer, Wroblewski, Aarnio, Peczenik Alexy and Taruffo: Joxxeramon 
Bengoetxea, “Text and Telos in the European Court of Justice Four Recent Takes on the Legal Reasoning of the ECJ” (2015) 11 European 
Constitutional Law Review 184, 214.  
55 Michal Bobek, “Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU” (2014) 39 European Law Review 418.  
56 ibid 419.  
57 Robert Cryer and others, Research Methodologies in EU and International Law (Oregon USA: Hart Publishing 2011); Ulla Neergaard, Ruth 
Nielsen and Lynda Roseberry (eds), European Legal Method—Paradoxes and Revitalisation (Copenhagen Denmark: Djøf Publishing 2011); 
Ulla Neergaard and Ruth Nielsen (eds), European Legal Method: towards a new European Legal Realism (Copenhagen Denmark: Djøf 
Publishing 2013); Ruth Nielsen, “Legal Realism and EU Law” in Koch and others (eds), Europe: the New Legal Realism: Essays in Honour 
of Hjalte Rasmussen (n 24) 545; Martijn Hesselink, “European Legal Method? On European Private Law and Scientific Method”, (2009) 15 
European Law Journal 20; Van Gestel, Micklitz and Maduro, “Methodology in the New Legal World” (n 54); Michal Bobek, “Legal Reasoning 
of the Court of Justice of the EU” (2014) 39 European Law Review 418; Gunnar Beck, “The Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice of 
the EU - A Reply to Michal Bobek” (2014) 39 European Law Review 579; Steven R Ratner and Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Appraising the 
Methods of International Law: A Prospectus for Readers” (1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 291, 292; Gregory Schaffer, 
“Melvin C. Steen Lecture, A Call for a New Legal Realism in International Law: The Need for Method” (2008) Minnesota Legal Studies 
Research Paper No 09-02 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1323912> accessed 31 July 2020.  
58 Eg Rob van Gestel on Cryer, Hervey, Sokhi-Bulley and Bohm: “They label ‘methodologies’ as diverse as: Natural law, Legal Positivism, 
Cosmopolitanism, Constitutionalism, New Governance, Queer Theory, Feminism, Postcolonial Theory, Marxism, but also Law and 
Economics, Law and Literature, and Law and Sociology: The latter raises .. questions: … why do they call these ‘schools of thought’ 
methodologies and not just different legal styles or cultures? … why are there such major differences between experts in the same field with 
respect to the canon of methodologies? Even more notable is that Creyer c.s. admit to use the words methodology, theory, and approach as 
synonyms but immediately add to this: ‘We rejected the use of the word ‘theory’ alone because in our experience many legal scholars, including 
the majority of PhD students in law, are uncomfortable with expressly identifying themselves as theorists.’… Although we can understand that 
legal scholars do not want to give the impression of being detached from legal practice, the latter remains strange for different reasons.”: Van 
Gestel, Micklitz and Maduro, “Methodology in the New Legal World” (n 54) 2.  
59 Eva Edwardsson and Helena Wockelberg, “European Legal Method in Denmark and Sweden—Using Social Science Theory and 
Methodology to Describe the Implementation of EU Law” (2013) 19 European Law Journal 364. 
60 Ruth Nielsen, “Legal Realism and EU law” in Koch and others (eds), Europe: the New Legal Realism: Essays in Honour of Hjalte Rasmussen 
(n 24) 545, 563.  
61 See Martijn Hesselink, “European Legal Method? On European Private Law and Scientific Method” (n 54); Kaarlo Tuori, “The Relationality 
of European Constitution(s). Justifying a new Research Programme for European Constitutional Scholarship” in Neergaard and Nielsen (eds), 
European Legal Method: towards a new European Legal Realism (n 58) 23-37. 
62 Clemens Kaupa, The Pluralist Character of the European Economic Constitution (Hart Publishing 2016). 
63 Marija Bartl, “Internal Market Rationality, Private Law and the Direction of the Union: Resuscitating the Market as the Object of the 
Political” (2015) 21 European Law Journal 572. 
64 Van Gestel, Micklitz and Maduro, “Methodology in the New Legal World” (n 54).  
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contributions here on the nature of the framing of the past and this brings us to the substantive 
content of this Special Issue.  
 
 
III. Outline of Special Issue 
 
This Special Issue in two dominant and grand themes of EU law- economic and regulatory, 
constitutionalism and the individual- focuses upon interdisciplinary consideration of how to 
predict the future of EU law. It considers thus future directions of European Union (EU) law 
and how this is done in a set of sub-disciplines of EU law. What sources and methods achieve 
this? How? The Special Issue probes a diversity of sub-fields, exploring inter alia the future of 
public and private law related themes, cutting-edge regulatory developments, the next 
legislative agenda and the post-Brexit constitutional legacy and landscape. It thus considers 
both the descriptive and normative contours of the legal, political and competence shifts that 
are likely, including from a comparative perspective. However, the Special Issue also probes 
the place of time, manner and space in future-mapping of subsets of EU law. The place of 
legislative and policy time-frames and court-centric time-frames arguably dominate legal 
methodologies of the future. Yet what strictures do they impose on analysis? Do they hamper 
analytical method logically? How can, do or should we frame future analysis beyond “court-
centric” frames- or not? How do distinct analytical sub-fields interact here or compare and 
contrast?  
The Special Issues thus aims to reflect upon the means to engage in future-mapping of an 
extraordinarily expanding field, with countless sub-disciplines emerging that increasingly 
demand esoteric expertise and new forms of collaboration to engage with it as a field. It invited 
participants to reflect upon ‘what’ and ‘how’, i.e. they map futures, inter alia, as a lexicon, 
methodology and end-point in their normative framing of their subject field.  
With all of the caveats aside about concerning the formulation of methodology of the 
future, how does this Special Issue hope to achieve its goals? For a start, all contributions 
engage in thematic debates relating to future methods of their subject fields and normative 
directions. All contributors are also assessing future frameworks and concern significant and 
profound social shifts and alterations to the status quo. A significant number consider how to 
eradicate legitimacy deficits and improvements to the nature of EU being cognisant of 
disciplinary challenges. The contributors range in area from highly established and significant 
areas e.g., constitutional, governance or market-based subjects to those with a more cutting-
edge dimension as to their regulatory concern. All contributions work towards the conceptual 
and constructive dimensions uniformly of directions of future-mapping. All contributors engage 
in what might be said to be some counter-homogeneity about the future and what it could be, 
from the normative, descriptive to conceptual. They are uniformly engaging in a spectrum of 
analysis about the future, methods, frameworks, actors and profound societal shifts, in particular 
tackling legitimacy deficits.  
Contributors were asked to capture the future of distinctive fields in an interdisciplinary 
collection of themes, including the following: i) How to frame and present future-mapping: 
methods, concepts, methodologies; ii) Analytical presentation of future integration and 
disintegration in their field, iii) Envisaging and mapping future competences, policies and 
expansion and/ or contraction; iv) Methodological openness of portraying the futures of sub-
fields of EU law; v) Understanding the travel of the field of EU law in respective sub-fields and 
vi) The direction of past to future developments in the field. They were asked to consider: what 
actors dominate? How does this fit methodologically? What lexicon shifts are apparent?  
In the stream of papers on ‘Economic and Regulatory futures’, the following papers 
feature: 
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Butler in The Future of EU International Agreements as Legal Instruments in the ASEAN 
Region, drawing from EU External relations law and regional studies, focusses upon the legal 
tools and technical procedures of EU-ASEAN widening and deepening. The future will see 
ASEAN integration occur at a quicker pace than the last half century. The article concludes that 
extensive bilateral international agreements will be reached between the EU and individual 
ASEAN Member States for the foreseeable future until ASEAN, an international organisation, 
is conferred, implicitly or explicitly, the necessary competence to conclude an international 
agreement coverings matters that the EU currently pursues bilaterally with individual ASEAN 
Member States.  
Costa-Cabral in Future-Mapping the three Dimensions of EU Competition Law, draws 
from competition law caselaw and official communications and accordingly maps EU 
competition law as a future mapping exercise beyond its traditional two dimensions. He 
considers the place of modernisation in the future of the digital economy using policy 
documents, legislation proposals, caselaw and theorisations of modernisation. There are two 
directions in which EU competition law can evolve- keeping close to modernisation or striding 
away. The normative character of competition law is radically changing- i.e. the reaction to 
COVID-19, and another long coming, proposals of new legislation. The article considers how 
there have been persisting questions of how competition law has allowed certain technological 
companies to acquire near-monopolistic positions. It considers two proposals of new legislation 
by the Commission, one on a ‘New Competition Tool’ and another on ‘Gate-Keeper Platforms.’ 
Future-mapping competition law can be assisted by a framework of these three dimensions, 
which engages directly with the normative breaks from the notion of abuse and consumer 
welfare justifications. 
Stefan in The Future of EU Soft Law: A Research and Policy Agenda for the Aftermath 
of Covid-19, drawing from governance, transparency, accountability literature and COVID-19 
emergency instruments,  this paper shows that the current crisis increases the salience of both 
the advantages and the drawbacks of soft law instruments. Doctrinal legal research has been 
rather critical to the phenomenon of soft law, pontificating that law is either hard, or not law at 
all, and leaving most of the work to the “lawyers in context”. Since the beginning of this 
Millennium however, legal scholars have become more and more involved in studying EU soft 
law and engaging with political science research. However, work has been focused mostly on 
the EU phenomenon itself and only marginally explored the potential for reform. The key 
finding is that soft law is mostly relevant at the national level, yet there are major variations 
regarding its effects, as well as the involvement of national authorities in the processes of 
adoption of such instruments. This article advocates for a better streamlining of the adoption 
and the national implementation of EU soft law, which would increase transparency while 
fostering participation and ultimately enlisting support of authorities and the judiciary at the 
national level. 
Zahn in What Future for the European Social Model? The Relevance of Early Intellectual 
Concepts of Social Integration, drawing from historical sources of EU social integration and 
archival material and literature, engages in reflections on the place of history in the past and 
future of the European Social Model in EU Labour law. It is a vivid attempt to use the past to 
construct the future, drawing from a source document worthy of revisitation. The EU social 
model has been critiqued for legitimising a neoliberal integration project and the time is ripe to 
examine the exclusions of solidarity and social policy from the Treaty of Rome.  
Kendrick in The Future of EU Differentiated Integration: The Tax Microcosm, drawing 
from differentiation, integration, VAT, digitisation and digital services literature argues that tax 
embodies the tensions between Member State sovereignty and EU law harmonising agendas, 
and in the context of the imperative to harmonise caused by the digitalisation of the economy, 
it is a microcosm. The tax microcosm demonstrates that there are limits to how far 
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harmonisation can go in the EU, and that the future will likely see more differentiated 
integration. Digitalisation may increase the need for differentiated integration in future in the 
area of taxation. In answering the research question, this article will demonstrate that there is a 
limit to how far harmonisation should go in the EU, and that in future-mapping developments 
in EU law, more differentiated integration will be used. Tax, as a microcosm, shows this to be 
the case.  
 
In the stream of papers on ‘constitutionalism and the individual’, the following papers 
feature: 
  De Visser in The Future is Urban: The Progressive Renaissance of the City in EU Law, 
considers the place of the city in EU Constitutional law, public law, multi-level governance and 
environmental law, providing an initial conceptual map of the patterns of interactions between 
cities and the European Union going forward where the future is undeniably urban. The future 
architecture of the EU’s operating system will evince a rapprochement between the socio-
economic clout of local authorities, notably cities, and their legal-political recognition at Union 
level. It argues that the local tier should be disaggregated, with cities treated as a distinct subset 
of the category of subnational authorities that warrant attention in their own right. The 
relationship between the EU and cities should be dissected further to develop a more fine-
grained map of the possible ways in which both levels interact and the norms and incentives 
that shape those interactions. There is persistent and progressive enfranchisement of cities, 
spurred on by self-directed transnational networking and by EU-led efforts to engage cities as 
direct dialogic partners under its new Urban Agenda. Mainstreaming cities could further benefit 
the scholarly dialogue on the operationalization of EU regulatory ideals. 
Ficchera in Framing EU Constitutional Time: A Future-Oriented Theory of 
Constitutional Change for the EU, drawing from EU constitutionalism, political theory, and 
comparative studies, frames a future theory of constitutional change for the EU. The European 
project is called upon to incorporate the temporal dimension more forcefully. Yet, precisely 
because the European project is reaching more advanced stages of integration, contradictions 
which were previously not addressed or minimized are bound to emerge more visibly- between 
constituent power and destituent power, but also between national and post-national; between 
localism and universalism; between (re-) politicisation and de-politicisation; between homo 
oeconomicus and homo juridicus; between thin constitutionalism and thick constitutionalism. 
Accordingly, a shift from self-referentiality to heterarchy is advocated, whereby concern for the 
local level of decision-making is taken more seriously. 
Lock in The future of EU human rights law: Is accession to the ECHR still desirable?, 
drawing from EU and ECHR caselaw, official documents and interdisciplinary debates on the 
EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, conceptualises the counter-factual by considering 
what the actual future of EU human rights law is and could have been. Lock hypotheses that 
Opinion 2/13 does not appear to have permanently dented the EU’s and the Council of Europe’s 
enthusiasm for accession. Accession negotiations were meant to recommence in March 2020, 
but had to be postponed due to the Covid-19 pandemic. In light of the overall negative reception 
of Opinion 2/13, he questions whether EU accession remains desirable in light of the conditions 
formulated in Opinion 2/13.  
Tzanou in The Future of EU Data Privacy Law: Towards a More Egalitarian Data 
Privacy, drawing from data privacy, socio-legal, gender equality and egalitarianism literature, 
assesses the state of the art of data caselaw, regulation and governance in EU law. She argues 
that the future of data protection law should not be technology driven and that it has suffered 
from an egalitarianism eclipse. The paper calls for a shift of the current focus of EU data privacy 
law from technological problems to societal problems of situationally disadvantaged parties 
that tend to go unremarked. The future focus of EU data protection law should be in developing 
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an egalitarian EU data privacy law guided by methods that bring forward neglected perspectives 
and narratives and ensure its inclusivity and diversity. Only if EU data protection law is 
attentive to the inequalities that the most vulnerable face, it can remain relevant in the future.  
Yong in The future of EU citizenship status during crisis – is there a role for fundamental 
rights protection?  maps the future of EU citizenship in times of constitutional crises from a 
doctrinal, political and socio-legal perspective, where the CJEU appears at odds with a deeper 
citizenship narrative. The paper brings citizenship status into the post-Lisbon context of the 
Eurozone crisis, the migration crisis, the rule of law crisis and the UK’s withdrawal from the 
EU. In each crisis, the claim is that there is room for fundamental rights protection to play a 
more pivotal role in protecting the individual as part of their status as an EU citizen. It argues 
that restrictive case law jeopardises the future of EU citizenship status and fundamental rights, 
and that there are legitimate reasons and a feasible way for these rights to be more central to 
the CJEU’s considerations. The Court of Justice of the EU’s apparent choice not to fully 
integrate fundamental rights into EU citizenship case law affects the fundamentality of EU 
citizenship status, as it was originally hailed to be. It argues that there is a case to be made for 
a stronger role for fundamental rights protection as part of the future of EU citizenship’s status. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
 
The distinctiveness of EU law from a methodological perspective as a relatively recent subject 
with a highly dominant court is worthy of significant attention. However, as has been argued 
here, the limitations of a court-centric subject have been increasingly manifesting themselves. 
An innate tendency towards interdisciplinarity also characterises the new era of EU law. Yet 
court-centric-ness often dominates here also. The state of the art appears arguably to be torn by 
the manner in which the subject has evolved.  
Particularly radical developments as to data/ empirics will bring new light to the as to the 
robustness of assumptions underlying the discipline. Yet it is unclear how far such radical 
developments will shift the substantive boundaries. Can historical ‘re-visitations’ of EU law 
reach saturation point ever? Where law in context is ‘normalised’ the improved futures of the 
EU, its scholarship, its laws and their adjudication are likely to be more robust.  
The Special Issue seeks to contribute to more explicit and composite time-mapping, 
synthesising the past and future in order to reform legitimacy deficits. Many do this through 
explicit interdisciplinarity, considering sources, and values (e.g. Costa-Cabral, De Visser, 
Tzanou), others through taking bold positions on court-centricness (e.g. Stefan, Yong, Lock). 
Ultimately, the means as much as the end is argued to be critical here when depicting the future 
of EU law in an new era of EU law.  
 
